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RECENT CASE NOTES
and the rights of the creditors were not prejudiced at the time of the
redemption. In Westerfeld-Bonte Co. v. Burnett22 it was held that where
there was a valid agreement to redeem preferred stock, the provision
for redemption was enforceable so long as it would not affect the collection
of claims by creditors, even tho it would result in winding up and disso-
lution of the corporation. This case seems entirely sound and would
always permit the redemption of preferred stock, where there was a
redemption provision, if the corporation is solvent. Furthermore, if a
creditor could interfere with the redemption of preferred stock even when
it would not be prejudicial to his interests it would always be an impossi-
bility to redeem preferred stock since practically all corporations have
some creditors at all times. C. A. R.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS--MARRAGE or INSANE PERsoN Vom--CMMON
LAW MARRIAGE PEsuMED.-Grace Langdon and William Langdon were
married Sept. 15, 1923, and since that time until the death of William
Langdon in 1929, the two lived together as husband and wife. Grace
Langdon upon her husband's death brought suit against the brothers
and sisters of William Langdon to quiet the title to her interest in her
husband's real estate, and for partition. The defendants filed a counter-
claim alleging that William Langdon was insane at the time of the mar-
riage to plaintiff, that she had no interest in the property, and asking
that their title be quieted and the marriage of Grace Langdon and William
Langdon be declared void. Held, altho the marriage of a person who is
insane at the time of the ceremony is absolutely void under Burns R. S.
1926, Sec. 9862, still, if the parties to the ceremonial marriage continued
to live and cohabit together as husband and wife, "the law will presume
a good common law marriage, the presumption being in favor of morality
and not immorality, legitimacy and not bastardy."1
It would seem that the court reached a desirable result in upholding
the marriage. "Every intendment of the law is in favor of matrimony.
When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular,
and whatever the form of proof, the law raises a strong presumption of
its legality; not only casting the burden of proof on the party objecting,
but requiring him throughout, and in every particular, plainly to make
the fact appear, against the constant pressure of this presumption that
it is illegal and void. So that it cannot be tried like ordinary questions
of fact, which are independent of this sort of presumption." 2 In accord-
ance with this theory it has been held that though a person once adjudged
insane by a proper tribunal is presumed to continue to be insane until
the contrary is shown,3 a person adjudged insane three years before a
marriage, was presumed to have regained his sanity at the time of such
2 Westerfield-Bonte Co. v. Burnett (1917), 176 Ky. 188, 195 S. W. 477.1 Langdon v. Langdon, Supreme Court of Indiana, Dec. 7, 1932, 183 N. E. 400.
2 Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, Vol. 1, 6th ed., sec. 457; quoted in Boulden
v. McIntire (1889), 119 Ind. 574, 21 N. E. 445; and cited in Weeing v. Temple
(1896), 144 Ind. 189, 41 N. E. 600. See also Castor v. Davis (1889), 120 Ind. 231;
Teter v. Teter (1885), 101 Ind. 129, 51 Am. Rep. 742; Franklin v. Lee (1901), 30
Ind. App. 31, 62 N. E. 78.
sReden v. Baker (1882), 86 Ind. 91.
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marriage.4 And where one of the parties to a marriage is shown to have
been previously married and that the first spouse is still living, a divorce
from the first spouse will be presumed unless the contrary is clearly
shown. 5
Marriage is made by statute a civil contract in Indiana,6 but it is
something more than an ordinary contract affecting the property rights
of the parties-it is an institution in which the public have an interest
and deep concern.7 It has this aspect of other contracts, in that both
parties must be mentally able to assent to it. If one of the parties to
the marriage is insane at the time of the marriage there can be no assent.
The insanity must in fact exist at the time of the marriage to avoid it;8
neither prior nor subsequent insanity is sufficient, nor are both prior and
subsequent insanity sufficient if the marriage took place in a lucid interval.9
But the authorities are in conflict as to whether such a marriage creates
a void, or merely a voidable relationship. It would seem the preferable
rule to hold such marriages merely voidable. But Indiana has by statute
declared the folowing marriages void: "First. Where either party has
a wife or husband living at the time of such marriage. Second. When
one of the parties is a white person and the other possessed of one-eighth
or more of negro blood. Third. Where either party is insane or idiotic
at the time of such marriage"'o By court decision, it is held the word
"void" as used by the Legislature means void, and not voidable."1 If
this holding be followed to its logical conclusion, the validity of the mar-
riage could be attacked collaterally by anyone, in any proceeding, and
in any court whenever the question arises, but it was held in Bruns V.
Cope12 that "the validity of a marriage may not be assailed in a stautory
action by heirs for partition of land of an alleged insane decedent." There
the action was brought by a brother of a deceased wife against the husband
to quiet his title and for partition of certain real estate possessed by the
decedent at her death. Plaintiff there alleged the decedent was insane at
the time of the marriage. This case was later cited with disapproval in
Wiley v. Wiley's as being contra to general authority, and contra to
authority cited with approval in the Bruns case. Evidently in the Bruns
case the court adopted the theory that the marriage in which one of the
parties is insane, is merely voidable and not void. For if it were merely
voidable, then it could only be attacked directly and by a party to it214
but not collaterally. A void act cannot be ratified and the authorities
agree that this also applies to marriage contracts, void ab initio.15 Where
4 Castor v. Davis (1889), 120 Ind. 231.
5Boulden v. McIntire (1889), 119 Ind. 574, 21 N. E. 445.
OBurns Anno. Stat. 1926, Sec. 9859.
7 Castor v. Davis (1889), 120 Ind. 231.
8Baker v. Baker (1882), 82 Ind. 146.
$Banker v. Banker, 63 X. Y. 409; Tiffany on Domestic Relations, p. 18.
20 Burns Anno. Stat. 1926, See. 9862.
2 Wiley v. Wiley (1919), 75 Ind. App. 456, 123 N. E. 252; Teter v. Teter (1885),
101 Ind. 129, 51 Am. Rep. 742.7 7Brun8 v. Cope (1914), 182 Ind. 289, 105 N. E. 471. See also Castor v. Davis
(1889), 120 Ind. 231.
U Wiley v. Wiley (1919), 75 Ind. App. 456, 123 N. E. 252.
".Pence v. Aughe (1885), 101 Ind. 317.
I Thompson v. Thompson, 114 Mass. 566.
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the act or contract is void ab initio no amount of ratification will make it
valid, but there must be a new contract, for there cannot be a ratification
of nothing.16
The theory of the principal case follows the dictum of Wiley v. Wiley,
supra, that "should an insane party be restored to sanity and thereafter
the two should live together as husband and wife for a long period of
time under circumstances evincing pure motives and good faith from the
beginning, then from their subsequent and continued conduct the presump-
tion may arise that the parties actually entered into a new marriage,
which new marriage, although there was no solemnization and no compliance
with any of the provisions of the statute relating to procurement of a
license, nevertheless in some cases may be valid at common law."17 It
seems to be the majority United States rule that where parties to an
agreemnt and relationship which, but for the existence of an impediment,
would have constituted a valid marriage, continue the relationship in good
faith, upon the removal of the impediment, the law will establish between
them a valid common law marriage.1S
A common law marriage is valid in Indiana.19 No formal ceremony
is necessary to create a valid marriage and if the parties make an agree-
ment to form a present matrimonial connection, followed by cohabitation
as husband and wife, no particular form of words is essential, provided
it appears that the engagement was entered into from pure motives, and
not for the mere purpose of sexual commerce.20 Cohabitation alone cannot
constitute a common law marriage, but cohabitation, conduct, reputation,
and actions are evidence to raise a presumption of marriage.21
The court in the principal case apparently overrules the case of Compton
v. Benham22 without mention in so far as the latter case holds that no
common law marriage will be presumed to arise from cohabitation as
husband and wife after the impediment is removed. In that case an
undivorced man married a woman who was ignorant of his incapacity,
the former wife subsequently obtained a divorce, and the second wife
continued to live with him, wholly ignorant of such former marriage or
of such divorce. It was held that the second marriage was void and that
no presumption of a common law marriage arose merely from cohabitation,
even though the parties were generally known as husband and wife. The
"6 Wiley v. 'Wiley (1919), 75 Ind. App. 456, 123 N. E. 252; Teter v. Teter (1885),
101 Ind. 129, 51 Am. Rep. 742.
17 Wiley v. Wiley (1919), 75 Ind. App. 456, 123 N. E. 252; Franklin v. Lee
(1901), 30 Ind. App. 31, 62 N. E. 78.
U Blackburn v. Crawfords (1865), 3 Wall. 175, 18 L. Ed.; Matter of Ziegler V.
Cassidy's Sons (1917), 220 N. Y. 98; In re Spondre (1917), 162 N. Y. S. 943;
MeClurkin v. McClurkin, 206 Ala. 613, 90 S. 917; Travers v. Reinhardt (1906),
205 U. S. 423, 27 S. Ct. 563; Stuart v. Schoonover (Oklia.) (1924), 229 P. 812.
"Teter v. Teter (1885), 101 Ind. 129, 51 Am. Rep. 742; Haddow v. Crawford
(1911), 49 Ind. App. 551; Trimble v. Trimble (1850), 2 Ind. 76; Bowers v. Van
Winkle (1872), 41 Ind. 432; 'iley v. Wiley (1919), 75 Ind. App. 456, 123 N. E.
252; see also Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. B. Co. v. Blind (1914), 182 Ind. 398; Castor
v. MoDole (1923), 80 Ind.App. 256, 137 N. E. 889.
"* Wiley v. Wiley (1919), 75 Ind. App. 456, 123 N. E. 252; Franklin v. Lee
(1901), 30 Ind. App. 31, 62 N. V. 78.
2 Compton v. Benham (1909), 44 Ind. App. 51; Williams v. Wiliams (1879),
46 Wis. 464; Foster v. Hawley (1876), 8 Hun. 68.
"Compton v. Benham, (1909), 44 Ind. App. 51.
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latter case reaches a distorted and highly undesirable result; for the second
wife, knowing neither of the previous marriage nor subsequent divorce,
could not have contracted a meretricious marriage. Teter v. Teter,23 a
previous case had reached the opposite result than that in the Benham
case, and under practically identical circumstances, did raise the presump-
tion of a common law marriage.
It would seem then, that the law in Indiana is that where one of the
parties to an ostensible marriage is insane at the time of such ostensible
marriage, no marital relationship is created, but that it is absolutely
void ab initio.24 The marriage of two parties, one of whom has been
previously married and is undivorced and the first spouse is still living
at the time of the second marriage, is also absolutely void. 25 In either
iristance such relationship may be attacked by anyone, at any time, in
any proceeding before any court. But, in the former instance, where a
party is once adjudged insane by a proper tribunal, although such party
is presumed to continue to be insane thereafter, in the absence of an aver-
ment and proof that the party was insane at the time of the marriage,
the law will presume the party to have recovered his sanity and that a
valid marriage was created. 26 Where there is an averment and proof
that one of the parties was insane at the time of the marriage, but no
averment that the incapacitated party thereafter continued to be insane,
and where the parties continue thereafter to cohabit for pure motives
and by their conduct are generally known as husband and wife, the law
will presume a good common law marriage between the parties. 27 And
in the latter instance, in the absence of any averment and proof that a
divorce had not been secured prior to the second marriage, the law will
presume that such divorce had been secured, and that the marriage was
legal.28 Where it is shown that a divorce was in fact not granted before
the second marriage, the second marriage being therefore void, but a
divorce was granted to the incapacitated spouse subsequent to the second
marriage, and the parties afterward cohabit in good faith, and by their
conduct are known as husband and wife, the law will presume a good
common law marriage.2 9  I. D. P.
INJUNTION-EXERCISE OF DiscRETioNARY POwER GRANTED TO ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE BoARD.-In order to contract for the transportation of school
children in the Washington school township of Daviess county for the
school years 1931-32, 1932-33, 1933-34, 1934-35, the county trustee pro-
ceeded under chapter No. 59 of the Acts of 1931, page 144. Ray Browning
submitted a bid of $3.00 per day, proposing to use a 1927 model Chevrolet
truck. Erve Padgett submitted a bid of $3.40 per day, proposing to use
a 1928 model Chevrolet truck. William Small submitted a $4.00 per day
23Teter v. Teter (1885), 101 Ind. 129, 51 Ami. Rep. 752.
24 Wiley V. Wiley (1919), 75 Ind. App. 456, 123 N. E. 252; Teter v. Teter (1885),
101 Ind. 129, 51 Am. Rep. 742.
2 Compton v. Benham (1909), 44 Ind. App. 51.
26'astor v. Davis (1889), 120 Ind. 231.
2 Wiley v. 'Wiley (1919), 75 Ind. App. 456, 123 N. E. 252; Langdon v. Langdon
(principal case), 123 N. E. 400.
2Boulden v. McIntire (1889), 119 Ind. 574, 21 N. E. 445.
'Teter v. Teter (1885), 101 Ind. 129, 51 Am. Rep. 742.
